Operation Earnest Will 2.0: Why 1987 Playbook Won't Work in 2026 Hormuz Crisis

In 1987, the United States launched Operation Earnest Will to protect Kuwaiti tankers from Iranian attacks during the Tanker War. Four decades later, the Trump administration is considering a similar response to threats against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. But the operational environment has fundamentally changed.

The parallels are striking. Then, Iran attacked tankers to destabilize oil markets and pressure Iraq. Today, Iran is using drone strikes and projectile attacks to disrupt global energy supplies following the US-Israeli military campaign. Both scenarios involve protecting merchant vessels in narrow waters against a technologically asymmetric adversary.

But the differences are stark. In 1987, Operation Earnest Will could deploy 60 ships and coordinate escorts with Belgian, French, Italian, Dutch, and British naval forces. Today, the US Navy's fleet is roughly half that size, and Europe has been reluctant to commit hardware. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK pledged to "contribute to appropriate efforts" on March 20, but without specifying minesweeping operations or escort assets. The commitment is rhetorical, not operational.

Worse, Iran's offensive capability has evolved dramatically. Drone technology that barely existed in 1987 is now central to Iranian strategy. The IRGC has demonstrated consistent ability to target moving vessels in the strait. Meanwhile, the US faces the strategic problem of policing 35 miles of water against an adversary willing to absorb losses. In 1987, attrition worked in America's favor. Today, a single mine or drone strike can trigger cascading insurance withdrawals, port closures, and weeks-long shipping disruptions.

The insurance market has already shifted. P&I clubs are scrutinizing Gulf transits, war-risk premiums have spiked, and dozens of vessels are anchored outside the strait waiting for clarity. No amount of military escorts can restore confidence if insurers won't cover the risk.

Historically, Operation Earnest Will succeeded because it provided visible deterrence and cleared specific shipping corridors. But modern tanker markets are global networks. A single lane protected by US destroyers doesn't fix the problem if refiners can source oil from other routes or alternative suppliers. The 400 million barrels removed from markets by the Strait closure has already forced a 50% oil price spike. Economic pressure, not naval presence, will determine whether tankers return.

The real lesson from 1987: military escorts alone don't end tanker wars. They buy time for diplomacy. Without a ceasefire or negotiated agreement, Operation Earnest Will 2.0 becomes an indefinite naval presence that drains resources while failing to resolve the underlying conflict. The Trump administration's ambiguous commitment to "wind down" military operations while simultaneously deploying more Marines suggests this is already understood. Expect the escort mission to shift from direct protection to minesweeping and shallow-water monitoring, with the bulk of risk management handled by private security contractors and insurance markets.