IMO Calls for Humanitarian Corridor—But Who Enforces It?

The International Maritime Organization held an extraordinary session March 18-19 in London—the first crisis-level Council convening since the Hormuz blockade began. The message was unambiguous: establish a safe passage framework immediately. The subtext was far more troubling: IMO has no power to enforce it.

IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez stated: I am ready to start working immediately in negotiations... However, for this to materialize, I will need the understanding, commitment and, above all, the concrete actions from all relevant countries and stakeholders. Translation: IMO can facilitate, not compel.

The Council's specific directives centered on two pillars:

1. Humanitarian Evacuation: Safe corridor for merchant vessels currently trapped in the Gulf, prioritizing seafarer welfare (crew rotation, food, fuel, communications).
2. Safe Navigation Framework: Coordinated international approach accounting for GNSS jamming, crew fatigue, and master authority—essentially, a de facto convoy or international minesweeping effort.

Neither directive acknowledges the institutional vacuum beneath it. The IMO is a technical maritime standards body. It can issue guidance. It cannot deploy naval assets, negotiate with Iran, or enforce traffic separation schemes. UN Security Council Resolution 2817 (referenced in Council remarks) condemns Hormuz threats but similarly lacks enforcement teeth without active participation from the permanent five powers.

This creates a peculiar governance paradox. Over 120 IMO member nations participated in the extraordinary session, including all 40 Council members. Collectively, they represent the entire global merchant fleet. Yet the framework they are calling for requires coordinated military/diplomatic action that lies outside IMO's charter.

The practical consequence is that safe passage will depend entirely on bilateral negotiations, not international law. This is already observable: Turkey and India have secured selective passage agreements directly with Iran. Japan reported readiness for Iran to allow Japanese-linked vessels through. These are state-to-state arrangements, not IMO-facilitated corridors.

Western maritime powers have notably declined to commit naval assets despite calls for minesweeping and escort operations. The UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, and Canada pledged vague contribution to appropriate efforts on March 20. Compare this to 1987-1988 Operation Earnest Will, when Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, and UK directly participated in escorts and mine countermeasures. Four decades later, the political will has evaporated while the threat environment has intensified—Iranian drones and mines present far greater risk than Silkworm missiles did.

For shipping companies and insurers, the implication is clear: IMO safe passage framework will remain a humanitarian aspirational document. The real passage decisions will be made through insurance, risk appetite, and individual state negotiations. Owners betting on IMO coordination rather than bilateral channels will find their vessels stranded longer.

The governance lesson is sharper: international maritime law assumes a consensus environment where great powers cooperate through multilateral institutions. When that consensus breaks (US-Iran military conflict), IMO becomes a discussion forum, not a decision body. The 500-year-old principle of freedom of navigation survives only to the extent that naval powers enforce it bilaterally.

Secretariat-General Dominguez's honest admission—I will need... concrete actions from all relevant countries—signals what maritime operators should expect: fragmented, state-by-state safe passage arrangements negotiated outside the IMO framework. The formal Council resolution provides diplomatic cover for these bilateral deals, not a unified international system.