IMO's Safe Passage Plan vs. Iran's Selectivity: A Humanitarian Framework That Won't Work

The Gap Between What IMO Wants and What Iran Will Allow

On March 19, the International Maritime Organization Council held an extraordinary session in London to address the Strait of Hormuz crisis. The outcome was a call for a "safe maritime framework" to facilitate the evacuation of merchant vessels currently confined in the Gulf region.

The framework would protect seafarers, ensure continuous provision of water, food, fuel, and other essentials to stranded ships, and establish a coordinated international approach to safe passage.

On March 22, Iran's representative to the IMO, Ali Mousavi, said Tehran was "ready to cooperate on Gulf maritime safety."

But Mousavi also said the Strait remains open "only to vessels not linked to Iran's enemies."

These two statements are irreconcilable.

The IMO Framework Assumptions

The IMO Council resolution assumes several operational premises:

1. A neutral entity can certify which ships are trapped vs. which can exit
2. Iran will accept IMO-brokered passage for humanitarian evacuations
3. Crew welfare (food, fuel, essential supplies) can be negotiated separately from vessel fate
4. "Trapped" vessels = vessels that should be evacuated, implying consent from all parties to the passage
5. International coordination can produce a mechanism that Iran accepts

None of these assumptions hold.

Iran's Stated Position

Mousavi said Iran will work with the IMO on maritime safety. But the same statement clarified that Tehran "was ready to work with the UN agency to improve safety and protect seafarers in the Gulf, while insisting the strait remains open, but only to vessels not linked to what Iran considers its enemies."

This is a classic diplomatic hedge: agree to cooperation while reserving the right to define which ships are enemy-linked.

The problem: Iran's definition of "enemy-linked" is fluid and strategic. It has already blocked ships registered to the U.S., Israel, UK, and France (Strait is explicitly closed to enemy shipping, per Iranian statements). But it has also allowed selective passages for Turkish, Indian, and Japanese-flagged vessels after bilateral negotiations.

This is not a neutral process. This is a chokepoint where Iran extracts concessions (diplomatic recognition, trade access, sanctions relief) in exchange for passage rights.

The Crew Welfare Paradox

The IMO resolution emphasizes that stranded seafarers must have access to water, food, fuel, and communication. This is a humanitarian imperative backed by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) and ILO conventions.

But these supplies must come from somewhere. Supply vessels themselves must transit the Strait. Iran must grant passage to supply ships. And Iran will not grant passage unless the supply vessels are deemed non-enemy-linked.

This creates a leverage point: Iran can agree to crew welfare (in principle) while restricting the supply chains that enable it (in practice). Crews would face acute shortages not because Iran opposes welfare, but because the vessels bringing supplies were blocked.

The Safe Passage Mechanism

The IMO framework envisions a coordinated international safety approach. The Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, stated: "I am ready to start working immediately in negotiations to establish a humanitarian framework to evacuate all vessels and seafarers trapped. However, for this to materialize, I will need the understanding, commitment and, above all, the concrete actions from all relevant countries and stakeholders."

The phrase "all relevant countries" includes Iran. And Iran's definition of "all relevant countries" excludes enemy nations.

In practice, this means: the IMO negotiates with Iran to define which vessels can depart. Iran will block enemy-linked vessels regardless of humanitarian status. The IMO will argue for expedited passage based on crew welfare. Iran will counter with arguments about security and precedent (allowing enemy ships to transit sets a dangerous precedent for future crises).

Weeks of negotiation will produce a framework that permits passage of non-enemy vessels (those already approved for selective transit) while leaving enemy-flagged and enemy-affiliated vessels in limbo.

The Real Mechanism: Bilateral Leverage

History shows how this actually works. Turkey negotiated with Iran for passage of Turkish-flagged ships. Japan negotiated directly for Japanese-linked vessels. India engaged in back-channel negotiations for Indian-flagged tankers.

Each negotiation was bilateral, not through the IMO framework. Each involved unstated concessions (diplomatic coordination, sanctions circumvention, intelligence sharing) exchanged for passage.

The IMO framework assumes a neutral arbitration mechanism. But no neutral arbitration exists. Instead, individual nations negotiate their own crew evacuations based on bilateral relationships and strategic trade-offs.

This means the "safe passage framework" will be implemented as a set of bilateral agreements disguised as international coordination. The IMO will be the venue, but the outcomes will reflect bilateral power relationships, not humanitarian principles.

Why This Matters for Future Crises

The Hormuz precedent is now set: maritime crises involving chokepoint closure will be negotiated bilaterally with the blocking state, using humanitarian crew welfare as a secondary negotiating point. The blocking state will define which nations are "enemy-linked" and thus ineligible for expedited passage.

This breaks the principle of freedom of navigation (codified in UNCLOS and IMO conventions). It replaces universal rules with strategic selectivity.

Future closures in other regions (Red Sea by Yemen, Persian Gulf by non-state actors, Malacca Strait by piracy) will follow the same pattern: humanitarian frameworks announced, bilateral negotiations quietly conducted, enemy-linked vessels stranded pending strategic concessions.

The IMO framework, well-intentioned, will become a diplomatic cover for strategic coercion.

The Forecast

Expect the IMO framework negotiations to produce an agreement in principle (both sides will claim success). Expect that agreement to reference "humanitarian evacuation corridors" without specifying which vessels qualify.

Expect individual nations (UK, US, France, Israel) to conduct separate negotiations with Iran for passage of their flagged vessels, likely offering diplomatic concessions or sanctions relief in exchange.

Expect the stranded vessels to remain in the Gulf for weeks, with crew welfare as an ongoing international pressure point but not a determinant of passage rights.

The safe passage framework will be real. But it will operate as a selective mechanism reflecting strategic leverage, not humanitarian principles.

That is the gap between what the IMO wants and what Iran will allow. And no amount of UN coordination will bridge that gap.