U.S. Navy Readies Hormuz Escort Missions as Precedent of 1980s Tanker Wars Looms: What Worked Then Won't Work Now

The U.S. government is preparing to do something it has done once before with limited success: escort commercial tankers through a hostile strait using naval force.

The Pentagon has deployed the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (approximately 2,500 Marines) along with USS Boxer (an amphibious assault ship) and supporting vessels. The mission brief is to establish a secure corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, allowing oil tankers and food shipments to pass despite Iranian interdiction and mining threats.

The historical parallel is exact: the 1987-1988 Tanker War, when Iran and Iraq attacked commercial shipping throughout the Gulf. The U.S. Navy responded with convoy escorts and minesweeping operations. The results were mixed. Escorts reduced losses compared to unprotected transit but did not eliminate them. The USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine and required six months of repair. Escorted vessels still suffered damage and casualties.

The asymmetric threat picture has evolved dramatically. In 1987, Iranian capabilities included anti-ship mines and fast attack craft. Today, the IRGC operates unmanned aerial vehicles with precision guidance, submarine-launched anti-ship weapons, and ballistic missiles with coastal-targeting radar. A 5,000-ton container ship presents an enormous radar target. A naval destroyer cannot physically defend a 10-vessel convoy from simultaneous drone attacks across a 35-mile-wide strait.

The geography favors the defender. The IRGC controls chokepoint islands. The strait narrows to 21 miles in its widest point and 10 miles in critical transits near the Hormuz approach. U.S. carrier strike groups operate effectively in open ocean environments where air defense systems have firing space. The Persian Gulf offers neither space nor margin for error.

The second order problem is enforcement. If the U.S. begins escorting non-U.S.-flagged commercial vessels, is that an act of commerce protection (defensible under the law of the sea)? Or is it coercion of Iranian sovereignty in territorial waters? The legal distinction matters. Control Risks has warned that escalation scenarios could include direct strikes on IRGC naval bases managing the corridor system, which would constitute expanded military operations beyond the current conflict footprint.

The Biden-Trump administration appears willing to accept some level of vessel losses as acceptable operational cost. The alternative—allowing Iran to maintain a stranglehold on global energy and food routes—is politically unacceptable. But losses will occur. Escorts reduce frequency, not incidence.

This is a fundamentally different problem from 1987. The threat is more precise, the geography is tighter, and the political stakes are higher. Escorts work as theater—they signal commitment. But they do not fundamentally alter the underlying fact: Iran controls the strait's geography, and controlling geography always beats controlling waters.